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Abstract 
In 2011 the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities were 
adopted. The present contribution addresses the possible relevance of these new rules for disputes 
regarding international satellite communication, noting the existence of various dispute settlement 





This contribution addresses the application of a new international dispute settlement sys-
tem—the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)1 2011 Optional Rules for Arbitration of 
Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities,2 or “PCA Rules on Outer Space Disputes”—
to international satellite communications. Satellite communications, as the most commer-
cialized, largest, and most down-to-earth among the various applications of outer space 
activities, provided a main rationale for establishing this new system in the first place.3 
Satellite communications for the present purpose could be defined as the totality of hard-
ware, software, and operations offering telecommunications facilities and services funda-
mentally making use of satellites in outer space to customers. 
While dispute settlement in the international arena is much older than satellite commu-
nications, and satellite communications in turn much older than the new PCA Rules on 
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Outer Space Disputes, the major question to be asked here is: whence the necessity to es-
tablish such a new mechanism, noting that already prima facie a number of existing dispute 
settlement systems would be available—as discussed further below in greater detail. The 
answer to that question should start from the fundamental assessment that satellite com-
munications is one of the most multifaceted sectors of the global economy. 
 
2. Satellite Communications and Dispute Settlement 
 
First, the above characterization applies to the physical infrastructure which allows satel-
lite communications to take place, and to do so across the entire globe: it comprises both 
(tangible) terrestrial and (tangible) space hardware, communicating to each other by way 
of (intangible) radio waves as driven by extended (intangible) software and protocols. While 
much of the hardware is placed on Earth, other parts are to be found in less easily accessi-
ble areas—and of course the satellites themselves, key elements of that infrastructure, func-
tion in the essentially inaccessible area of outer space. 
Legally speaking, this already means that many different national laws and jurisdictions 
are involved, applicable to the hardware present on the territory of the states concerned 
(ranging from ground stations to individual user communication devices), the software 
and protocols developed for those areas, and the radio waves to the extent “traversing” 
such jurisdictions.4 
In addition, the use of outer space for both satellites and traversing radio waves to and 
from them means that a “global commons” is also involved, that is an area where individ-
ual state jurisdiction does not apply on a territorial basis, and the limitations to the basic 
freedom to act at a comprehensive level are and can only be set by international law.5 While 
obviously that raises the issue of where the air spaces subject to territorial sovereignty, 
vertically speaking, give way to the international area of outer space, that issue will not be 
discussed here.6 
Second, due to the mix of military, political, social, economic, and commercial reasons 
for undertaking satellite communications, it is a sector where not only many governments 
but also a handful of intergovernmental operators—notably as of today INTERSPUTNIK7 
and ARABSAT8—are active, as well as a host of private companies. Among the latter, more-
over, three of the most important evolved from intergovernmental structures and still op-
erate under the sway of an intergovernmental supervisor: Intelsat,9 Inmarsat,10 and Eutelsat.11 
This in turn means, in legal terms, that the legal aspects—and hence potential dis-
putes—can involve any or all fields within public international law, national administra-
tive law, civil and sometimes even criminal law, as well as private international law and 
contract law. Any ideal dispute settlement mechanism should be able to handle effectively 
and properly all such aspects within one coherent system. While, for instance, the afore-
mentioned intergovernmental and formerly intergovernmental satellite operators under 
their constitutive documents have created their own dispute settlement systems, those can 
be used only for disputes between the organization and/or member states and moreover 
only for disputes concerning the activities conducted in the context of the organization and 
legal rights and obligations following therefrom.12 
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Third, as a consequence of the varied interests and legal characteristics of the stakehold-
ers, also from a practical perspective many various aspects of the activities involved might 
be at issue in a dispute needing to be settled by legal means. These aspects range from the 
more technical and operational ones such as the technologies involved and the proper us-
age of radio frequencies, to trade and commercial issues of the right to provide or receive 
services, to political and security issues of satellite communications as critical infrastruc-
ture and, in many cases, involving high-level dual-use technology, to social aspects such 
as the provision of “public services.” 
In the legal realm this also translates into a large variety of uncoordinated legal regimes 
being potentially of import on the operations in terms of subject matter. Whereas for ex-
ample on the international level, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)13 pro-
vides the legal framework for the coordination of usage of radio frequencies, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)14 does so with respect to the provision of services, while there 
is no globally binding regime regulating the traffic of dual-use goods as far as relevant for 
satellite communications—that remains essentially a matter of national export control re-
gimes.15 
In sum, it will be clear that this large kaleidoscope of applicable legal regimes, potential 
players and stakeholders, interests and subject matter potentially subject to dispute, in it-
self will make disputes so much more likely, substantive, and in need of solution. This once 
again poses the fundamental question of whether any existing mechanism for dispute set-
tlement (of which some of the main relevant ones will be discussed below) would adequately 
allow coverage of all disputes thinkable—noting of course that in the overwhelming ma-
jority of instances, common sense, negotiation, and diplomacy suffice to preclude disputes 
from requiring recourse to properly legal dispute settlement systems in the first place. 
 




In the following overview, attention will be paid only to those existing dispute settlement 
mechanisms which are of a decidedly legal character—that is, basically, those of judicial 
settlement and arbitration. While this is not to deny the validity and usefulness of many 
nonjudicial dispute settlement mechanisms, especially in the international community, 
such as diplomacy, mediation, and conciliation,16 the absence of the possibility to arrive at 
a binding settlement and a third party in the end imposing such settlement, a key common 
element in those mechanisms, causes them to be of a fundamentally different character. 
Most importantly, also, in those mechanisms predominantly legal analyses and consider-
ations could and often do take a backseat to other concerns. 
 
3.2. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), often nicknamed the “World Court,” is the primary 
judicial organ of the United Nations and operates on the basis of a Statute which is an 
integral annex to the UN Charter; thus, all UN member states are ipso facto parties to that 
Statute.17 It consists of fifteen judges chosen from different nationalities, including one 
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from each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.18 The ICJ sits in The 
Hague, The Netherlands, and can issue both binding judgments in disputes and Advisory 
Opinions (which obviously are not of a legally binding nature).19 
For satellite communications as sketched above, however, the ICJ mechanism presents 
a number of “shortcomings” from the perspective of an ideal mechanism able to handle all 
relevant disputes in a single coherent and effective fashion. 
First, in terms of actors or stakeholders as potential disputants, the route to the ICJ is 
only formally open for states.20 While international organizations may provide information 
relevant in a case before the Court21—as well as request for an Advisory Opinion, if 
properly authorized22—they cannot themselves instigate a procedure or be a party to such 
a procedure in its own right. Private entities (such as currently most satellite operators are) 
even more fully depend on a particular state (usually the state of their nationality), more 
precisely first its willingness to undertake such an action of “diplomatic protection” and 
second its jus standi, meaning that the private company has complied with the prior re-
quirement of “exhaustion of local remedies.”23 
Second, though all UN member states, and thereby almost all existing states, are parties 
to the ICJ Statute, the ICJ is only able to adjudicate disputes between states which have, 
one way or another, accepted ICJ jurisdiction. Effectively, there are four generally recog-
nized ways in which such acceptance can be shaped. 
By way of the first two scenarios, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases 
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the 
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”24 In other words, parties to a dis-
pute may at that stage refer that dispute in common agreement, by way of a document 
usually labeled “Compromis,” to the Court, respectively existing treaties may refer to the 
Court as the (or a) dispute settlement system to be used in case of disputes arising regard-
ing the subject matter of such a treaty. 
Under the third scenario, “[t]he states parties to the present Statute may at any time 
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in re-
lation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international 
law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an inter-
national obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of 
an international obligation.”25 
The fourth scenario arises where in a given case one party to the dispute addresses sub-
stantive matters, as opposed to just questioning the ICJ’s jurisdiction, which is then inter-
preted as amounting to de jure acceptance of that jurisdiction—the so-called forum 
prorogatum.26 
Third, in this context major limitations to possibly applicable law exist. The ICJ is 
charged with adjudicating disputes with a rather broad clause on applicable law—encom-
passing “a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  A B O U T  T H E  N E W  PCA  R U L E S  (2 0 1 5 )  
5 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law,”27 and can also in principle decide a case ex aequo et bono.28 Yet, 
for example, national or contract law normally cannot be applied. There is a clear and ob-
vious focus of this Court on public international law, as the “law of nations,” which also 
determines the main legal expertise of the individual members of the Court.29 
Fourth, also in another crucial context parties have little autonomy and control over the 
proceedings: the persons adjudicating the dispute. The fifteen judges of the ICJ are elected 
without any specific reference to a case or the parties thereto. The only exception is where 
a party to a dispute does not have a judge of its nationality on the court, in which case it 
may appoint an ad hoc judge.30 While furthermore the possibility exists for the Court to 
compose—at its discretion, though presumably in close consultation with the parties to the 
dispute at issue—a chamber for a specific category of cases or even a single case, the mem-
bers of such a chamber will be constituted from among the fifteen sitting judges.31 
Fifth, and finally, in view of the more traditional character of state-to-state disputes and 
the law of nations, the political role of the United Nations of which the ICJ is the primary 
legal organ, and the focus on overarching public law aspects of any disputes brought be-
fore it, there would be a certain risk that expertise with the specific, high-level, and con-
stantly evolving technology at issue in satellite communications would be largely absent 
with the judges themselves, which almost automatically would require experts to be called 
upon to explain such technological and operational issues behind any legal dispute.32 
 
3.3. The ITU dispute settlement system 
With the ITU, ever since the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1959, being re-
sponsible for the international coordination of radio frequency usage by satellite systems 
and their ground infrastructure,33 it would make sense to next investigate the extent to 
which settlement of satellite communications disputes could be achieved within the ITU 
framework. Indeed, the ITU Constitution and ITU Convention together provide for a few 
options to use in case a dispute arises.34 
First, however, the essence of this system is the potential absence of a binding resolution 
of a dispute. Thus, “Member States may settle their disputes on questions relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Constitution, of the Convention or of the Administra-
tive Regulations by negotiation, through diplomatic channels, or according to procedures 
established by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them for the settlement 
of international disputes, or by any other method mutually agreed upon.”35 Then, “[i]f 
none of these methods of settlement is adopted, any Member State party to a dispute may 
have recourse to arbitration in accordance with the procedure defined in the Conven-
tion.”36 In the alternative, an “Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
Relating to This Constitution, to the Convention, and to the Administrative Regulations 
shall be applicable as between Member States parties to that Protocol.”37 The Protocol essen-
tially amends the procedure of Article 41, but its invocation also establishes an arbitration 
tribunal.38 
Such an explicitly listed multitude of options, including two partly alternative arbitra-
tion mechanisms, it seems, would not be very conducive or compelling for parties to arrive 
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at a binding third-party settlement—or, to put it in other terms, there are too many explicit 
opportunities for states to dodge the binding settlement of disputes. 
A second shortcoming from the perspective of the satellite communication sector as a 
whole concerns the limitation of access to these mechanisms to states only. This is certainly 
in line with the traditional character of the ITU as an intergovernmental organization com-
posed of sovereign states39 as further reflected in the ITU role in allotting frequencies to 
states requesting them, who in turn may assign them to nongovernmental operators.40 
While recently nonstate actors have become empowered to participate as “Sector Mem-
bers,”41 this does not provide them with any voting or other key co-decision-making pow-
ers in the context of the ITU governance structure.42 Consequently, also, in any dispute to 
be settled under the mechanisms offered by the ITU treaties, it is one government or an-
other which would have to take up the case of a private operator. 
The third major shortcoming concerns almost the mirror-side of the general lack of the 
ICJ’s expertise in specific technological and operational matters. In view of the orientation 
of ITU’s role on precisely the latter category, one might question the extent to which any 
arbitration instigated under Article 41 of the ITU Convention or the Optional Protocol would 
be sufficiently aware of public international law, political and security, and trade and com-
mercial aspects to comprehensively understand and address all potential angles to a satel-
lite communications dispute. 
 
3.4. The WTO dispute settlement system 
Satellite communications increasingly having become a commercial sector with world-
wide scope, the next area where relevant disputes might arise would concern that of inter-
national trade in goods and (especially) services, and the regime applicable thereto. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),43 established in 1947 to progres-
sively break down the international barriers to trade in commodities, already at least in 
principle could encompass goods and products in the context of satellite communications. 
More importantly, however, the extension in 1994 of the main principles and rules of the 
GATT to the service sector by way of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)44 
and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WT0)45 as a formal organization 
to underpin and further promote the aims of GATT and GATS, triggered its application to 
telecommunications, including satellite communications. This took place in particular as 
per the establishment of a 1997 agreement on basic telecommunication services,46 following 
the general GATT- and GATS-approach of applying the general regime to specific sectors 
by way of specific and tailor-made further international agreements. 
While the substance of application of GATS/WTO rules to the satellite communication 
sector effectively depended upon a complex web of individual states’ commitments, the 
above also meant the dispute settlement system for international trade disputes as per the 
WTO Agreement now became applicable to satellite communication disputes, to the extent 
that these concerned international trade aspects of satellite communication services.47 
In sum, this system consisted of a system of “escalating” dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, starting with consultation and then moving up through panels, the Appellate Body 
and ultimately a Dispute Settlement Body, where parties however may also decide on ar-
bitration.48 
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This WTO dispute settlement regime essentially “suffers” from the same set of short-
comings as the ITU dispute settlement mechanisms discussed above. 
First, it does not (necessarily) give rise to a binding solution imposed by a neutral third 
party, although it comes rather close by “creating a reverse consensus rule that maintains 
arbitral or appellate decisions unless a consensus vote rejects them.”49 While Annex 2 to 
the WTO Agreement consistently speaks of “recommendations and rulings”50 of the DSB, 
suggesting the latter would be binding as different from the former, this is nowhere ex-
plicitly stated.51 
Second, it does not allow private companies having issues with a particular WTO-
devolving regulation or the interpretation, implementation, or application thereof to assert 
a claim on its own behalf in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement regime.52 This 
is of course not surprising with a view to the character of the WTO as a classical interna-
tional intergovernmental organization, yet automatically means many important actors 
and stakeholders in international trade will not have direct access to such dispute settle-
ment procedures—and this analysis also applies squarely to satellite communications. 
Third, the WTO in turn is obviously very focused on trade and commercial aspects, and 
hence expertise in those areas as necessary for dispute settlement will in principle be 
broadly available. By contrast, however, many potential other angles to a trade or com-
merce dispute involving satellite communications, such as the technical/operational, politico-
security and social approaches, might easily be left out of the considerations or treated 
insufficiently or incorrectly. 
 
3.5. The Liability Convention dispute settlement clauses 
The next dispute settlement mechanism to be briefly scrutinized from the perspective of 
satellite communications concerns the Liability Convention,53 the space treaty dealing with 
liability for damage caused by space activities. More precisely, it handles damage caused 
by a space object, liability for which is then attributed to the “launching State”—depending 
upon where the damage occurs, under a regime of absolute liability respectively of fault 
liability.54 While a definition of “space object” is not really provided, there is no doubt that 
satellites such as used for telecommunications would be covered, and hence that the Lia-
bility Convention would be relevant.55 
The Liability Convention includes provisions for the solution of disputes on relevant 
cases of damage and liability. To begin with, the victim state should present its claims for 
damage to the launching state(s) through diplomatic channels.56 If however no settlement 
is arrived at within a year after notification of the claim, the claimant state (or indeed also 
the defendant state) may have recourse to establishment of a “Claim Commission,” a mech-
anism which in appearance is very similar to arbitration.57 Upon closer view, this mechanism 
has three fundamental “shortcomings” from the perspective of satellite communications. 
First, the scope of the Convention, and thus of the Claims Commission’s competences, 
is rather limited ratione materiae. As already transpires from the above, the Convention’s 
clauses only deal with damage caused by satellites and liability therefore. This immedi-
ately raises a few issues. Issues of accountability broader than that of liability—in particu-
lar, that of general “international [state] responsibility for national activities in outer space”58—
can, if giving rise to international disputes, not be properly solved by this mechanism. This 
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could refer to, for example, claims that a particular satellite is violating international law 
prohibitions of inciting racism or war, where no (immediate) damage would be at stake. 
The restriction of the Liability Convention’s dispute settlement mechanism to cases of 
damage caused by satellites means that it does not even apply to all imaginable cases of 
damage occurring in the context of satellite operations. Damage caused independently 
from the satellites by other elements of the satellite communication system—ground sta-
tions and mobile devices, for example—are by definition not covered; only the space seg-
ment could be implicated. 
“Damage” is defined by the Convention as “loss of life, personal injury or other impair-
ment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, 
or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”59 This is generally per-
ceived to refer, first, to physical damage only, where damage “caused by space objects” is 
generally interpreted to mean “damage caused by collision with a space object” (excluding 
for instance damage caused by mere electronic interference60), and second, to direct physi-
cal damage only (excluding indirect damage such as loss of revenues61). Precisely since 
cases of electronic interference and commercial loss of revenues are high on the list of con-
cerns of private commercial operators, this is a considerable limitation in the light of cur-
rent realities. 
The second shortcoming is also a familiar one: the Claims Commission mechanism as 
such is available only to states. Private entities could have any claims asserted only through 
their state of nationality, subsidiary to the state where the damage might have occurred 
(presuming cases where the damage was suffered on Earth).62 
Intergovernmental organizations may have a—relatively exceptional—possibility to 
qualify as an equivalent to “state parties” under the Convention if the majority of member 
states are parties to both the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention,63 but upon 
closer view this does not rise to the level of autonomous jus standi with respect to (estab-
lishment of) a Claims Commission. 
If, on the one hand, the intergovernmental organization in question qualifies as “launch-
ing State” for the purpose of the Convention, a claim for damage may indeed be presented 
to the organization itself by any victim state. However, if such organization has not paid 
out within six months the compensation requested, the claimant state has the right to refer 
to individual member states of the organization (or other “launching States”).64 Noting the 
one year-term following diplomatic assertion of the claim before establishment of a Claims 
Commission could be undertaken,65 this effectively means recourse to the mechanism of 
the Claims Commission is precluded for the organization itself. 
If, on the other hand, the intergovernmental organization would qualify as a victim of 
damage at issue, in spite of its status as a “quasi-party” to the Convention, it would have 
to rely on one member state or another to assert claims on its behalf, whether by way of 
diplomatic negotiations or by way of the Claims Commission route.66 
It has to be said here finally that the Liability Convention itself recognizes that it may 
not be the most feasible or desirable tool for dispute settlement even within its realm of 
application—disclaiming any status as exclusive remedy, it explicitly allows for other, na-
tional dispute settlement mechanisms and even grants them priority: “Nothing in this Con-
vention shall prevent a State, or natural or juridical persons it might represent, from 
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pursuing a claim in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State. 
A State shall not, however, be entitled to present a claim under this Convention in respect 
of the same damage for which a claim is being pursued in the courts or administrative 
tribunals or agencies of a launching State or under another international agreement which 
is binding on the States concerned.”67 
Also the waiver of the requirement of “exhaustion of local remedies,”68 normally im-
posed as the standard in international law before state-to-state claims are allowed with 
respect to damage privately suffered, testifies to the desire to not unduly obstruct the pos-
sibilities for private entities to obtain compensation for damage suffered. It makes it easier 
for states to indeed take up the interests of a private operator in such a case—but of course 
this does not amount to any jus standi for the private operator himself with respect to a 
Claims Commission. 
Third, in spite of its appearance as a mechanism of arbitration, judgments of the Claims 
Commission are not automatically binding. They enjoy that status only if both parties to 
the dispute at the outset have so agreed, which is not that likely to arise in the highly po-
liticized environment of space activities, including satellite communications69; otherwise 
the decision shall be a “final and recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider 
in good faith.”70 
 
3.6. National dispute settlement systems 
Next, a word about national dispute settlement systems. A clear pointer to their potential 
relevance for satellite communications disputes is already provided for by the aforemen-
tioned Liability Convention, as it explicitly refers to such domestic legal dispute settlement 
mechanisms as an alternative to its own mechanism.71 Obviously, however, with almost 
all states in the world being somehow involved in satellite communications it is far beyond 
the scope of the present paper to address all those domestic dispute settlement systems. 
At the same time, this characterization of the sector means that in principle any of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms which are part of the national legal systems could indeed 
be implicated; and from an abstract perspective they have some general traits in common 
which may make them less than ideal to solve most satellite communications disputes. 
Essentially, this stems from their character as being a matter of national law. Following 
sovereignty over national territory, most of the laws enunciated by a state first apply to 
activities conducted on such territory, and the national court system consequently is enti-
tled to adjudicate disputes on such laws—as much as they would be entitled, subject per-
haps to the national private international law regime, to adjudicate disputes on contracts 
with a substantive connection to that state. Secondly, some national laws may also apply 
to nationals of the state, regardless of where they were active or concluded their contracts, 
although both concepts such as lex re sitae and the lack of executive competences within 
another state may stand in the way of actual enforcement—and sometimes give rise to 
labels of “extraterritorial” (exercise of) jurisdiction. 
Still, any settlement of a dispute by such means will almost by definition concentrate on 
the national elements using national law and regulation, which may only provide a feasible 
solution in case the dispute itself is also (almost) exclusively of a national nature. Apart 
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from a range of more de facto problems this would entail for any dispute on satellite com-
munications with substantial international aspects, there is one particular legal issue which 
in tum relates to the large measure of governmental and intergovernmental operations still 
prevailing in the sector at large—that of sovereign and functional immunities. 
If foreign governments were implicated in a dispute before a national judge, they would 
be likely to raise the bar to jurisdiction of sovereign immunity; even if involved in satellite 
communications of a predominantly commercial nature, there might be many aspects of a 
sovereignty-sensitive nature involved.72 
Intergovernmental organizations such as INTERSPUTNIK73 andARABSAT74 at least to 
the extent of their aims, purposes, and operations would similarly enjoy functional im-
munities, recognized at the very least by their own respective member states. With ITSO,75 
IMSO,76 and EUTELSAT IGO,77 the same would apply, though likely in a more intricate 
fashion since those IGOs mainly perform a supervisory function where the actual satellite 
operations are conducted by the private Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat. 
Though strictly speaking this does not concern satellite communications, discussions on 
liability in the context of satellite navigation have already pointed out that sovereign im-
munities in the US context may severely limit options for private claimants to be compen-
sated for damage that is the consequence of erroneous or absent GPS signals. Absent 
specific provisions to the contrary, any claim for public liability against the US government 
would be inadmissible under sovereign immunity.78 
By way of exceptions to the rule, precise regulations then exist which provide for cir-
cumstances where the sovereign immunity of the US government is or might be waived. 
The relevant US regulations for the present purpose would be the Federal Tort Claims 
Act,79 the Suits in Admiralty Act,80 the Foreign Claims Act,81 and the Military Claims Act.82 
Generally speaking, it is rather uncertain, however, that either of these acts could be used 
for the successful assertion of claims regarding GPS failures and consequent damages, and 
as a result claims for US public liability for GPS might easily fail.83 For example, the Federal 
Tort Claims Act does not apply in case of “any claim arising in a foreign country.”84 Or, 
the Suits in Admiralty Act applies only if “the accident (1) arose on the high seas or navi-
gable waters of the United States; (2) posed a potential threat to maritime commerce; and 
(3) was substantially related to traditional maritime activity.”85 
Moreover, in view of the global application of GPS the problem of non-US citizens 
claiming for compensation at US courts would remain. From a practical (and political) 
point of view, such claims would require the claimant to travel to the United States, intro-
duce his claim in English to US courts, possibly hire a US lawyer, and suchlike. There 
would be no fundamental legal impediment for non-US citizens to do so, but in practice it 
might turn out to be rather difficult to assert one’s claims. Furthermore, one may consider 
a claim before a US court against the US government for damage resulting from the usage 
of signals provided for free not a very promising venue in terms of possible success. 
Lastly, it could certainly be doubted whether other governments—which would ulti-
mately be held (at least) responsible for the safety of aviation in their own airspace86—
would agree to sue in a private capacity within the US legal and jurisdictional order. This 
obviously was the main reason for such states in the ICAO context to propose a relevant 
treaty on GNSS liability should be drafted.87 
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It should be mentioned for completeness’ sake that if the damage occurs in another ju-
risdiction than that of the United States, in principle it might be possible to claim for dam-
ages against the GPS providers in courts of such jurisdictions. In practice however, apart 
from political considerations and issues of evidence, already the “option” for the United 
States not to waive its sovereign immunity would make any such possibility a theoretical 
one. 
While, as said, satellite navigation legal issues play out largely outside of the legal frame-
work for satellite communications properly speaking, there would be sufficient overlap 
and commonality for the above to be potentially applicable in international satellite com-
munication disputes before a domestic court or other—and thus testify to the complica-
tions of doing so. 
 
3. 7. International arbitration 
Many of the shortcomings referred to above are closely related to the essence of a judicial 
dispute settlement system: a rather inflexible system allowing for very little party auton-
omy, for example, in key areas as regards involving judges with specific relevant know-
how—since courts are never constituted by parties to a particular dispute once that dispute 
requires settlement by legal means—and the applicable law—which is equally prescribed 
upfront. When the benefits of this “inflexibility”—such as the stability and coherence in 
jurisprudence, methodology, and applicable law—are not perceived to outweigh the dis-
advantages, often international arbitration comes in. 
Alongside some other differences, the main distinctive traits as compared to judicial 
settlement are precisely the possibility for parties to co-decide on the arbitrators that are to 
decide a case, and to co-determine the applicable law. Most closely related to the PCA 
Rules on Outer Space Disputes in this respect are the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules88 
and the PCA Rules on Environmental Disputes,89 which is also why the PCA Rules on 
Outer Space Disputes have used those two sets of rules as point of departure.90 
Even those two sets of rules, however—apart from more generic drawbacks such as the 
relative lack of stability and coherence referred to above—suffer from a few characteristics 
which may make them less than optimal for the solution of space law disputes. 
The most important is that any arbitration rules (general ones as much as the environ-
mental or other sector-specific ones) would also encounter difficulties in properly reflect-
ing all aspects in the typical mix encountered in the context of space activities: highly 
public, political, and security-related aspects (much more so than even in the environmen-
tal dispute context, let alone the more familiar standard arbitration systems) alongside in-
creasingly commercial and other more mundane aspects, as well as the need, more 
prominent than in almost any other sector of international relations, to understand tech-
nological and operational issues. 
Consequently, for example, those other preexisting arbitration regimes would offer little 
opportunities to ensure confidentiality of information which could be desirable either from 
a security91 or from a commercial92 perspective. Also the highly desirable option to involve 
various categories of experts was not considered sufficiently facilitated.93 Nevertheless, 
both the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the PCA Rules on Environmental Disputes 
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were used as points of departure for the PCA’s initiative to draft special rules for space 
disputes. 
 
4. The PCA Rules on Outer Space Disputes 
 
4.1 Background and rationale 
The PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities 
were adopted on 6 December 2011 during a special session of the PCA Administrative 
Council of member states—currently numbering 115.94 This adoption followed a process 
of some three years, in which the Secretary-General of the PCA, Mr. Christiaan Kroner, 
undertook a preliminary assessment of the need and desirability of establishing such a 
specific set of rules and then established an Advisory Group under the chairmanship of 
Judge Fausto Pocar to draft such rules for the purpose of presentation to the Administra-
tive Council. 
The rationale for establishing this specific set of rules was provided as follows: “These 
Rules are based on the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules with changes in order to: 
(i) reflect the particular characteristics of disputes having an outer space component in-
volving the use of outer space by States, international organizations, and private entities; 
(ii) reflect the public international law element that pertains to disputes that may involve 
States and the use of outer space, and international practice appropriate to such disputes; 
(iii) indicate the role of the Secretary-General and the International Bureau of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague; (iv) provide freedom for the parties to 
choose to have an arbitral tribunal of one, three, or five persons; (v) provide for establish-
ment of a specialized list of arbitrators mentioned in article 10 and a list of scientific and 
technical experts mentioned in article 29 of these Rules; and (vi) provide suggestions for 
establishing procedures aimed at ensuring confidentiality. The Rules are optional and em-
phasize flexibility and party autonomy. For example: (i) The Rules, and the services of the 
Secretary-General and the International Bureau of the PCA, are available to States, inter-
national organizations, and private parties; and (ii) The Rules may be used, inter alia, in 
relation to disputes between two or more States parties to a multilateral agreement relating 
to the use of or access to outer space concerning the interpretation or application of that 
agreement. Where arbitrations deal with technical questions, provision is made in article 
27 for the submission to the arbitral tribunal of a document agreed to by the parties, sum-
marizing and providing background to any scientific or technical issues that the parties 
may wish to raise in their memorials or at oral hearings. A model clause that parties may 
consider inserting in treaties or other agreements to provide for arbitration of future dis-
putes, and a model clause for arbitration of existing disputes are set forth in the annex to 
these Rules.”95 
The present contribution does not purport to deal in great detail with the Rules on Outer 
Space Disputes96 but rather highlights the most salient aspects as following from the earlier 
survey of existing dispute settlement mechanisms as well as the above rationale. 
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4.2 Fundamental scope of the rules 
The first such point concerns the flexibility desired to avoid discussions on whether a dis-
pute on satellite communications would address only the “inspace” aspects (so that for 
example the Liability Convention’s dispute settlement mechanism could be triggered), 
only the technical/operational aspects (so that the ITU’s dispute settlement mechanism 
could be triggered) or only the trade-related aspects (so that the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism could be triggered). 
Here, the PCA Rules leave it completely to the parties to avail themselves of the Rules. 
The legal basis for the dispute is irrelevant; using the Rules for “disputes between [parties] 
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not” is dependent solely 
upon agreement between the two parties involved.97 Even more fundamentally: “The char-
acterization of the dispute as relating to outer space is not necessary for jurisdiction where 
parties have agreed to settle a specific dispute under these Rules.”98 
Thus, the Rules avoid the difficult issue of what constitutes “space activities”: activities 
conducted in space (whether by humans physically in space or basically guided from 
Earth), activities directed at or aimed at space (such as launching activities, which may even 
fall short of actually entering the area of outer space), and/or activities dependent on space 
activities (such as the sale of remote sensing data or the terrestrial use of satellite naviga-
tion). Thereby, it also avoids the difficult discussion on where “outer space,” as an area, 
begins.99 
As is quite usual under arbitration rules, agreement by a party to arbitrate automatically 
means that party waives any immunity from jurisdiction it might otherwise invoke, although 
a waiver of immunity from execution of any arbitral award must be expressed explicitly.100 
This is a fundamental clause in any arbitration regime which allows jus standi for both 
states and nonstate actors, as otherwise the principled legal equality of parties to a dispute 
would be fundamentally jeopardized. 
Immunity from execution, while also a principled barrier to such legal equality, does 
require explicit agreement of a state party to a dispute both for practical and for principled 
reasons. Nevertheless, the assumption is that one way or another a state faced with an 
award imposing specific obligations, for example, to pay a fine would in good faith abide 
by such an award even if immunity from execution had not been waived in that particular 
case. If failure to satisfactorily allow execution of such an award by a state invoking im-
munity from execution would give rise to serious injustice, there would then be a residual 
possibility at least in principle for the state of the victimized nonstate party to raise the 
issue to an international, state-to-state level, and by way of diplomatic protection for ex-
ample seize the International Court of Justice.101 
 
4.3 Establishment and operation of the tribunal 
The PCA Rules also provide for a set of clauses on how the arbitral tribunal is to be estab-
lished. Noticeably, the PCA Secretary-General shall act as the appointing authority, using 
the PCA secretariat and its broad experience with international arbitration as the adminis-
trative supporting mechanism for organizing the arbitration.102 
The size of the arbitration panel is another area where maximum flexibility was striven 
for: while the default option would be three arbitrators, other panel-sizes may also be 
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opted for with a five-arbitrator panel being mentioned explicitly but no size a priori being 
excluded.103 Thus, if the technical, operational or political complexity of a case so warrants, 
also seven- or nine-member panels could be established. 
The PCA Secretary-General provides the fallback option for nominating arbitrators if 
the parties to the dispute fail to meet the deadlines for making their appointments.104 The 
PCA also facilitates the use of the Rules by providing a list of legal experts which qualify 
and have indicated their willingness to serve as arbitrators—as options for parties to dis-
putes who may not feel comfortable in looking for arbitrators on their own.105 
The PCA Rules contain the “usual” clauses on obligatory disclosures by arbitrators of 
circumstances potentially inhibiting their impartiality, on possible challenges of arbitrators 
on such grounds by any of the parties to the dispute, and the procedure for replacement, 
if necessary.106 
The Rules also provide for a full waiver of the liability of arbitrators and, more exten-
sively, of “any person appointed by the arbitral tribunal” for “any act or omission” con-
nected to arbitration.107 The addition of other persons than the arbitrators themselves refers 
in particular to expert witnesses and the confidentiality adviser, the need for which may 
as argued be particularly prominent in many space activities-related disputes.108 
 
4.4 Major procedural provisions 
With respect to the procedure, also the arbitrators are handed a large measure of discretion, 
as “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appro-
priate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage 
of the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case.”109 
Similarly with regard to allowing third parties to join the proceedings the arbitrators 
enjoy the ultimate competence to decide: “The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any 
party, allow one or more third persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided 
such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless the arbitral tribunal finds, after 
giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, the opportunity to be heard, 
that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any of those parties. The arbi-
tral tribunal may make a single award or several awards in respect of all parties so in-
volved in the arbitration.”110 
The only nondiscretionary precondition for such joinder, the need for the third party to 
be party to the arbitration agreement, serves as a guarantee—with a view to the potential 
complexity of cases in terms of potentially afflicted parties, subject matter, and applicable 
law—that such a third party would also be formally and fully aware of the way the arbi-
tration is going to be handled, and its rights and obligations following from such joinder. 
This notably also includes the novelty the Rules on Outer Space Disputes provide as 
compared to other arbitration mechanisms, giving rise to the concept of the “confidential-
ity adviser.” Here, a rather special procedure caters for the presumed occasional need to 
respect confidentiality, exceptionally even secrecy, in the context of commercial or security-
sensitive information. 
First, a party may call for information to be classified as “confidential.”111 The Tribunal 
then decides on whether such classification would actually be granted, on the assumption 
that “the absence of special measures of protection [of information requested to be tagged 
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confidential] in the proceedings would be likely to cause serious harm to the party or par-
ties invoking its confidentiality.”112 It then also decides “under what conditions and to 
whom the confidential information may in part or in whole be disclosed and shall require 
any person to whom the confidential information is to be disclosed to sign an appropriate 
confidentiality undertaking.”113 
In the alternative—and this is the real novelty—the Tribunal may, at the request of ei-
ther party or also proprio motu, appoint a “confidentiality adviser,” an independent expert, 
“in order to report to it on the basis of the confidential information on specific issues des-
ignated by the arbitral tribunal without disclosing the confidential information either to 
the party from whom the confidential information does not originate or to the arbitral tri-
bunal.”114 This clause walks a thin line between the need to accommodate the supreme 
interest of one party or the other to keep certain information confidential to such an extent 
that it determines its willingness to submit to arbitration and the due process requirement 
that opposing parties should be allowed to have access to information used for making 
judgmental decisions in particular disputes. Whether the line is so thin as to actually break, 
is currently a matter of conjecture, and will remain so unless tested in cases invoking the 
Rules as well as the confidentiality clauses. 
 
4.5 Applicable law 
With regard to the applicable law, the Rules provide that “the arbitral tribunal shall apply 
the law or rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dis-
pute.”115 If no such designation has occurred, the arbitrators are to apply the national 
and/or international law rules they determine to be appropriate.116 Also deciding “as ami-
able compositeur or ex aequo et bona” is an option for the Tribunal only if parties have ex-
pressly authorized such a ground for decisions.117 If a contract is involved in the dispute, 
the Tribunal “shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, if any, and shall 
take into account any usage of trade applicable to the transaction.”118 
“Usage of trade” refers to such non-legal, semi-legal, or meta-legal concepts as best 
practices, standards of behavior, and guidelines, which—certainly in the absence of spe-
cific substantive “hard law” on the issue—may come to serve as yardsticks for whether 
legally binding standards regarding “reasonableness” and “good faith” are complied 
with.119 
 
4.6 Issues of evidence and expertise 
In the general analysis above, attention was drawn to the large measure of technicality and 
the resulting needs to provide for proper evidentiary rules and involvement of experts. 
Here, it is obviously for the Tribunals to decide on “admissibility, relevance, materiality 
and weight of the evidence offered.”120 If considered appropriate, nontechnical documents 
may be requested by the arbitrators from the parties to explain certain pieces of infor-
mation.121 
Finally, of course, experts on scientific or technical matters may be called upon by the 
Tribunal after consulting the parties, which may be challenged by any of the parties.122 Also 
here the PCA will play its facilitating role, in drawing up a list of such scientific, technical 
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and/or operational experts, although once again the freedom remains to call upon experts 
outside of such a list.123 
 
4. 7 Measures and awards 
The Tribunal can impose interim measures at the request of one of the parties.124 “Interim 
measures” are defined as “any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to the issu-
ance of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a 
party, for example and without limitation, to: (a) Maintain or restore the status quo pend-
ing determination of the dispute; (b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking 
action that is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to the arbitral 
process itself; (c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award 
may be satisfied; or (d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolu-
tion of the dispute.”125 
In other words, as is normal in regard of interim measures, the tribunal should weigh 
the interests of a claiming party in not seeing any possible favorable outcome—which con-
sequently should prima facie be a realistic possibility—prejudiced by irreversible events 
and the interests conversely of a defending party in not seeing any possible favorable out-
come to that party being prejudiced. 
Like any true arbitrary award—and differently, for example, from the Liability Conven-
tion’s Claims Commission mechanism—also awards of the Tribunal under the PCA Rules 
on Outer Space Disputes are “final and binding on the parties,” unless a “simple” error is 
detected afterward which may then be corrected.126 Awards will be decided by majority if 
there is more than one arbitrator.127 Separate awards are possible if circumstances so war-
rant in the view of the Tribunal.128 Unless parties have decided otherwise, the reasons for 
the award will be provided by the Tribunal.129 Requests for (further) interpretation of an 
award can be honored.130 Finally, additional awards may also be requested by the parties, 
such requests to be honored at the discretion of the Tribunal.131 
 
4.8 Costs 
Finally, the PCA Rules on Outer Space Disputes provide for important directions on the 
costs of the arbitration procedure. Default allocation of those costs is to the “unsuccessful” 
party or parties; as it is, however, often not that clear-cut whether both parties may be 
considered at least partly “unsuccessful,” the Tribunal may also provide for apportion-
ment of those costs otherwise.132 Costs in this respect “include(. . .) only: (a) The fees of the 
arbitral tribunal to be stated separately as to each arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal 
itself in accordance with article 41; (b) The reasonable travel and other expenses incurred 
by the arbitrators; (c) The reasonable costs of expert advice and of other assistance required 
by the arbitral tribunal; (d) The reasonable travel and other expenses of witnesses to the 
extent such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal; (e) The legal and other costs 
incurred by the parties in relation to the arbitration to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable; (f) The fees and expenses of the 
International Bureau, including the fees and expenses of the appointing authority.”133 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The PCA Rules on Outer Space Disputes offer, as compared to the existing and applicable 
dispute settlement mechanisms, the most comprehensive coverage of all aspects of satellite 
communications, and hence of all possible disputes regarding such activities. Through var-
ious mechanisms it takes into account terrestrial aspects versus space aspects, national law, 
and jurisdiction versus international law and the “global commons” character of outer 
space, the various categories of actors and stakeholders, public as well as private (and in-
cluding any contractual law issues), and finally the technological and operational complex-
ities of the sector—each at least as well as, and often more efficiently and coherently than 
those other mechanisms briefly recounted here. 
Flexibility for the tribunal as well as the parties, and party autonomy, are truly maxim-
ized by way of such provisions as allowing the parties the ultimate decision on whether to 
use the Rules or not, on the size of the arbitral tribunal and on applicable law, within a 
coherent system. Ample room is also offered for taking the technological and operational 
complexities into due consideration. 
The only serious caveat relates to the confidentiality adviser; it remains to be seen 
whether the best here would indeed have been the enemy of the good, or whether this 
procedural novelty causes more damage to the due process than it helps bring about solu-
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